Solana Founder Fears Quantum Computers Will Crack Bitcoin's Code by 2030

What did Yakovenko really say at All-In 2025?

At the All-In 2025 Summit, Solana co-founder Anatoly Yakovenko said there was a “50/50 chance” of a major quantum breakthrough within the next five years, calling on the Bitcoin community to move to quantum-resistant signatures by 2030. Many media outlets picked up on their comments and their arguments: Bitcoin’s current signature mechanism could be compromised within a strict quantum timeline, and waiting for certainty would be a policy mistake.

The reason this warning is so important is that if wallet cryptography is broken, proof of ownership is broken. Even without a full network takeover, an attacker who can derive the private key from the public key can still steal funds from exposed addresses, especially long-defunct wallets whose public keys are visible on-chain. It's a potentially large market impact and complex scenario.

Technical Core - Bitcoin is still vulnerable to attack

Bitcoin uses elliptic curve signatures (ECDSA; Schnorr under Taproot) on the secp256k1 curve to prove spending authority. A powerful enough quantum computer running Shor's algorithm can derive the private key from a leaked public key, defeating both ECDSA and Schnorr; this is qualitatively different from Grover's speedup against hashes. In short: signatures are the weak point, not PoW hashes. Bitcoin developers and educators have acknowledged this problem for years.

Two nuances keep the issue from becoming an "instant apocalypse":

(1) Addresses with hidden public keys (i.e. coins never spent) are more secure until the first spend reveals the key.

(2) A coordinated transition to post-quantum (PQ) signatures could solidify UTXOs established before Q-day. But such a transition is a non-trivial, network-wide operation with wallet, node, and exchange logistics.

The next prototypes

Outside of crypto, the world of standards has shifted. The US NIST finalized its first post-quantum cryptography standards in August 2024—notably ML-KEM (Kyber) for key establishment and ML-DSA (Dilithium)/SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+) for signatures—with further selections to follow in 2025. This provides the open source community with a list of vetted quantum-safe signature schemes to evaluate for wallets and protocols.

Yakovenko's time pressure is at play here: Bitcoin doesn't need theoretical math; it needs practical technical choices (which scheme, how to encode addresses, fee/size trade-offs, hardware support) and a plan to activate years before competitors can exploit laggards.

Evaluation and Conclusion

Yakovenko’s warning is not a prediction, but a deadline. The technical data is clear: ECDSA/Schnorr is vulnerable to a sufficiently powerful quantum adversary; NIST PQ signatures already exist; and migrating a ledger worth hundreds of billions of dollars requires years of ecosystem coordination. Whether Q-day falls in 2030, 2035, or later, the main risk is waiting for certainty. Bitcoin can maintain its high level of security—and its story—by starting the migration now.

Learn more about Quantum Computers!

Disclaimer: The information presented in this article is the author's personal opinion in the cryptocurrency field. It is not intended to be financial or investment advice. Any investment decision should be based on careful consideration of your personal portfolio and risk tolerance. The views expressed in this article do not represent the official position of the platform. We recommend that readers conduct their own research and consult with a professional before making any investment decisions.